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Crime and the Labor Market
ABSTBACT
Much work on crime hasfocussedon the effect of criminal
sanctions on crime, ignoring (except as a control variable) the effect
of labor market conditions on crime. This study reviews studies of
time series, cross area, and individual evidence pertaining to the effect
ofunnployment and other labor market variables on crime and conpares
the "slrength" of the labor market-crime and the sanctions-crime relations.
It corcludes that there is a labor market-crime link butthat thislink
is not well estimated by existing studies and is weaker than the sanctions-
crime link. The rise in crimein recent yearsdoes not appear to be
greatly due to the perforrnanoeofthe labor market.
Richard B. Freeman




CRIMEAND ThE LABOR MARKET
'Arethere people really walking around saying there isno
relationship between crime and unemployment? Are we beatinga
dead horse here? Is there a unanimous consensuson the subject or
do we have something more to prove?" (Congressman JohnConyers,
cited in Unemployment and Crime, Hearings before theSubcommittee
on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary House of
Representatives, Ninety—fifth Congress, Serial No. 47,p. 90)
The notion that the labor market, throughunemployment, is an
important determinant of the crime level has a definiteappeal.
Someone with a full—time high—paying job is, most ofus believe, less
likely to engage in crime, particularly economic crime, thansomeone
out of work. After all, iSn't idle time the devil's handmaiden?
Despite the plausibilty of the claim that highunemployment
causes crime, empirical analysis shows at best a moderate link between
unemployment and crime. In some analyses the expected significant
postive relation is found, but in others, it is not. Similarly,some
studies find a significant postive relation betweenpoverty (measured
in various ways) and crime while others do not. Whileno one would
gainsay a relationship between the labor market and crime, thestrength
and magnitude of the link are more subtle and difficultto determine
than one might expect.3
Thisessay examines modernresearch on the relation between the
labormarket and crime. While there have been somereviews of the
literature (Gillespie, Witte and Orsogh,Witte and Long) the effect of
thelabor market, especially unemployment, on
crime has not received
the same attention as the effect ofcriminal sanctions on crime rates
(see National Academy of Sciences Panel onResearch on Deterrent and
Incapacitative Effects, 1978, and PhilipJ. Cooke "Research in Criminal
DeterranceLaying the Groundwork for the SecondDecade"). This
imbalance in the current state of analysisis unfortunate, for it
directs more attention to the 'stick ofdeterrence than to the
'carrot' of improved employment prospects, despite
the fact that the
underlying behavior presumably depends onboth.
The essay begins with a brief review ofthe economic rationale
for expecting the labor market to influencecrime, considers the
various methods used by social scientists tostudy the expected
relationship, and then turns to the main issue:the empirical findings
of the various studies. In this reviewI make an effort to delineate
carefully differences among types ofstudies in a way which will
hopefully illuminate the meaningof the work and provide suggestions
for additional analyses that may yieldthe "something more" needed for
a "unanimous consensus."4
What Labor Market —CrimeLink Should We Expect?
As a starting point, let us consider briefly the modern
analysis of the economics of crime', which underlies work on the effect
of the labor market as well as on the effect of criminal sanctions on
crime. The modern work is grounded on an individual choice model,
which treats the decision to engage in crime in the same manner as a
decision to engage in any other potential money—making activity. It
postulates that an individual chooses to commit a crime depending on
the expected benefits and costs. The benefit from crime depends on the
chance of success and the money (utility) obtained; the expected cost
depends on the chance of being caught (1 minus the probability of
success) and convicted, the criminal sanctions and the earnings lost as
a result of imprisonment and the time allotted to the criminal
activity. In this framework the labor market is expected to influence
crime through the cost side: workers with high paying jobs will
presumably commit less crime than workers with low paying jobs or the
unemployed because the higher paid face a greater opportunity cost from
crime. Their time is more valuable in legitimate activities and they
risk losing more income if they are incarcerated than lower wage or
unemployed persons. Because crime is risky, moreover, the analysis
directs attention to risk attitudes in the decision, with further
behavioral consequences. Essentially the economic model treats crime
like any other career or activity choice, in which persons respond
positively to the benefits and negatively to the costs of choosing the
activity.5
Since few would disagree that people
respond to incentives in
rational ways, the issue in analysisis the magnitude of such responses
——whetherthey are important enough toshow up in observed data or
whether they are too small or unimportantto matter in that behavior.
It is for this reason that the vast
majority of studies have had an
empirical orientation.
Methods of Studi
Social scientists have sought to measurethe impact of labor
market conditions on crime usingfour distinct types of studies, each
of which has advantages anddisadvantages for pinning down therelation
under study:
(1) Time series analyses in whichthe crime rate is compared
to the level of unemploymentand related labor market indicators over
time. This is the most direct way toexamine the effect of the
business cycle on crime and thus foranswering the question of what
might happen to crime levelsif overall job prospects improved.Time
series analysis does, however,suffer from a myriad of problems,the
most serious of which is thecollinearity of variables (the tendency
for many variables to move togetherover time, providing little
variation from which to discern theindependent effect of each). It
also suffers from an interpretative problem:a time series analysis
which shows that crime varies overthe business cycle can be
interpreted as indicating that unemploymentaffects the timing rather
than the level of crime. A personwho decides to commit a robbery,for7
relations. In the case at hand, it turns out that in several studies
crime is inversely related to the percentage nonwhite in an area. At
face value, this implies either that blacks are less likely to be
criminals or that black areas are subject to less crime that white
areas ——bothhighly questionable conclusions in light of other data.
(3) Comparisons of individuals who Commit crimes with those
who do not. Analyzing the economic model of crime with data for
individuals has the advantage of focusing on actual decision—makers.
For charateristics of individuals that are relatively fixed (race, sex,
age, education) it provides a useful tool for inferring differences in
crime rates. For variables that change or are potentially controlled
by the individual, however, there are serious inference problems. One
could, for example, interpret the fact that criminals are more likely
to be unemployed than others in two ways: as supporting the claim that
unemployment led the person into crime, or as indicating that the
person was unemployed because he/she planned a crime. The direction of
the causal link is, in the absence of other information, impossible to
determine.
(4) Social experiments, in which the government alters the
labor market opportunities for criminals, as in the Baltimore Living
Insurance for Ex—prisoners Project or the Transitional Aid Research
Project (TARP)2. Conceptually, an appropriate experiment to test the
unemployment —crimelink is to provide jobs at specified levels of pay
to part of the released prisoner population while letting the other6
example, may be more likely to rob during arecession because of a lack
ofalternatives, but he/she might commit thecrime even if unemployment
were always lower than at present.The analogy here is with a woman
who decides to work one quarter outof the year. When stores puton
many people near Christmas,she rationally chooses to work at that
season,but in the absence of suchseasonal demand for labor, she would
stillwork one quarter a year.
(2) Cross—sectional (ecological) analysis ofcrime rates and
labor market conditions across geographic areas.Because crime rates
and other factors vary widely across states orcities, providing
considerable variation in data, many analystsseek to infer the causes
of crime from cross—sectional data. In contrastto time series
analysis, cross—section studies are morelikely to reveal "permanent"
responses to crime rates to unemploymentthan to reflect the timing of
decisions and are generally free from collinearityproblems. They,
however, suffer from their own setof inference problems: the
possibility that areas differ in bothlabor market and crime for
reasons having to do with theunmeasured 'nature' of the area,
producing spurious or hiding truerelations; the possibility that
migration of criminals, say from high unemploymentto low unemployment
areas may eliminate the link of unemploymentto crime in area data,
despite the fact that high unemploymentconditions create more
criminals; and the 'ecological correlation' problemarising from the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































part fend on their own.Presumably the group with jobs wouldhave a
lower crime rate. Since individualswould be assigned to the groups
one could be able to inferthe direction of causality of any linkage as
being from unemployment to crime.In fact, most experiments have not
'guaranteed' persons jobs but rather haveprovided offenders with job
placement and income supportfor several months after prisonwhich have
more complex effects onbehavior3. Even if the 'appropriate'
experiment worked, we should note thedanger of 'experimental
contamination' in the sense that jobs generated by agovernmental
program may differ fromthose generated in a free market.
In short, none of the methods used tostudy the labor market —
crimelink are perfect. Each provides a potentialanswer to somewhat
different questions, and each is subject tothe problems of
nonlaboratorY data analysis. If eachmethod yielded similar results,
we might indeed be 'beating adead horse here,' and we would have a
unanimousconcensus. As we shall soon see, however,the methods yield
somewhat different results, requiring acareful assessment of the
meaning and consistency of the work.
The Time SeriesRSUlt8
Table 1 provides a capsulesummary of the results of a variety
oftime series analyses of the link betweenlabor market factors and
crime,and where available of the link betweendeterrence variables,
(such as chances of being convicted, lengthof criminal sentences) and
crime as well. The models vary greatlyin time coverage, explanatory




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































of changes in crime on changes in unemployment(Phillips) to
sophisticated time series systems models (Phillipsand Ray). All of
the models examine the effect of unemployment rates oncrime; some also
examine the effect of labor force participation rates;because of
collinearity with time, only a few also look at otherlabor market
variables, such as income; three contain deterrencevariables whose
impact can be compared to that of unemployment,in terms of
significance or magnitude.
The general finding from these studies is that unemployment
and/or labor participation rates have the expected impact oncrime
rates, but that the effect tends to be modestin magnitude, explaining
little if any of the upward trend of crime in the periodsstudied. The
labor participation rate is often found to have a closerlink to crime
than unemployment, suggesting that those who leave thelabor force are
the most crime prone. In the few studies which includeincome
variables, the level of income (interpreted as a measureof gains to
crime) was positively related to crime; while income inequalityis also
found to be positively related to crime. The threestudies which
included deterrent variables found them to be more closelyrelated to
crimethan were the labor market variables.
To provide a flavor of the time series evidence, Ihavegraphed
infigure 1 the relation between the uniform crime rateand
unemployment rate for the period 1947 to 1980. Thecrime rate is
dominated by an upward trend but there is a definite cyclical component
related to unemployment which can be seen in the scatter diagram.A13
Long,I have made a crude tabulation of the results of these studies,
dividing the findings into four categories: Those with strong
(statistically significant) effects in the expected direction; those
with weak (insignificant) effects in the expected direction; and those
with strong and weak effects in the opposite direction. The results
for unemployment (or labor force participation), for income variables
viewed as measures of the incentive to commit crime and as the
incentive to choose legitimate work, and criminal sanctions, are given
in Table 2 in terms of the number of studies fitting into each
category. Because analysts usually estimate more than one equation,
with somewhat different results, the categorization is rough, based on
an overall evaluation of the findings. While undoubtedly one could
change some of the classifications, the table provides a reasonable
picture of the tone of results.
With respect to unemployment the majority of studies yield
insignificant relations between unemployment and crime but of those
that yield significant results, all are in the "correct" direction and
the majority show a positive relation. Whether this is to be taken as
strongor weak evidence for the existence of an unemployment —crime
relationis up to the reader to decide for him or herself. The
preponderance of evidence is more favorable to a positive linkage than
not, but if one was anticipating an overwhelmingly strong relation, one
will be severely disappointed.12
multivariate regression of the crime rate on the unemploymentand a
trend variable (with allowance for serialcorrelation) yields an
estimate of the effect of a one unit change in unemploymenton the
uniform crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of .05,of moderate
statistical significance4. This coefficient indicatesthat a doubling
of the unemployment rate from 5 percent to 10 percentwould raise the
crime rate by 5 percent in the l980s, though whetherthis would
represent a permanent increase incrime or simply a shifting in crime
from the low to high unemployment year cannot bedetermined.
Overall, while not all of the analyses in Table1 yield
significant results and while none show unemploymentto be the dominant
determinant of crime, they lend overall support to thenotion that crime
varies over the business cycle.
The Cross—Section Results
There have been a large number of studies comparingcrime rates
across states, cities, or SMSAs. Sample sizes,variables included, and
the periods covered differ considerably. In recent years manyof the
studies have been of a simultaneous equations type,with restrictions
designed to identify the effect of deterrent variables;the labor
marketfactors are always taken as exogenous. A typicalmodel includes
an equation relating crime to criminal penalties orresources spenton
police,labor market conditions, and other factors; and asecond
equation for the level of criminal penalties or policeresources.
From the reviews of the literature by Gillespieand Witte and15
The results with respect to other labor market variables are
similar. Income of the overall population in an area taken as a
measure of the possible gain from economic crime and various measures
of the income of the poor, often the fraction of the population in
poverty, viewed as an indicator of the opportunity cost of crime,
obtain estimated effects which are in the right direction, and
significant in a fair number but not a majority of cases.
For purposes of comparison Table 2 also provides a count of
estimated effects of criminal sanctions. Here, the results are
noticeably stronger, with the majority of studies finding strong
impacts in the anticipated direction.
There are two possible reasons for the differential impact of
the labor market and deterrence variables. One possibility is that
considerable effort has gone into measuring deterrence while the labor
market factors, usually entered solely as "controls," have not received
such careful attentioii As a result, it is likely that the deterrence
variables are better measured than are the labor market variables,
biasing the coefficient of the latter toward zero relative to the
coefficients of the former5. For example, most cross—section studies
use a simple aggregate unemployment rate whereas the level of crime
among young people out of the labor force suggests a youth—out—of—
labor—force measure would be better. A second related reason may be
the different specificity of the variables: deterrence variables
relate directly to the options facing potential criminals, while
general labor market variables do not: the potential criminal may be14
TABLE 2:Scorecard. for Results of Cross—SQctional AnyL°f
Labor Market Crime Link
Number of studies with specified link tocrime
Stong Weak Weak Strong
Correct Correct IncorrectIncorrect
Direction DirectionDirectionDirection
1. Unemployment 4 7 4 0
2. Income as Incentive 5 3 3 1
to Commit Crime
(Average Income)





4. Criminal sanctions 10 3 4 0
Source: Based on the following studies listedin the bibliography:
Allison, Bartel, Ehrlich (1974, 1979), Fleisher, Forst,Greenwood and
Wadycki, Creison, Gylys, Hoch, Land and Felson, Mathur,McPheters and
Stronge, Nagel, Pogue, Quinney, Sjoquist, Swimmer,Weicher.17
they will have lower skills, lower wages when working, and considerably
more unemployment than the average (see Table 3 for documentation).
Isnt this clearcut evidence that unemployment and poor labor market
performance are a major cause of crime? Why does it, on the face, tell
a stronger story than the time series and cross—section evidence just
examined?
There are several possible explanations for the stronger
relation between unemployment and labor market performance in the
individual than in aggregate data.
(1) The individual data may not be reflecting the effect of
unemployment (other labor market failures) on crime but, rather, the
fact that the criminal population consists of people who are unable to
succeed in the mainstream society due to "underlying personal
characteristics." That is, the cause of both the unemployment and
criminal activity may be a third variable having to do with the
individuals attributes.If this were the case, changes in labor
market conditions would have little or no effect on the persor(s life
in crime, although we would always find the criminal having a poor work
record.16
quite responsive to his own unemployment(or wage) prospects but those
prospects may be only weaklyrelated to aggregate market conditions.
Finally, how should we assess the scorecardresults in Table 2?
In its evaluation of studies of the effect of deterrence oncrime, the
NAS—NRC Panel on Research on Deterrent and IncapactitatiVeEffects
concluded that "we cannot yet assert that the evidence warrants an
affirmative conclusion regarding deterrance .. . (although).. . the
evidence certainly favors a proposition supporting deterrence morethan
it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent. .. ." (p.7) As
the results with deterrence variables are generally strongerthan those
with labor market variables, readers who agree with thePanel
conclusion will be even more circumspect in reaching theaffirmative
conclusion regarding unemployment and other labor marketfactors. They
will agree with Orsagh and Witte that the economic modelof crime, "as
that model relates to unemployment and income is notconfirmed by tests
performed on aggregate data sets" (p. 8). After all, morecoefficients
on the labor market variables are insignificantthan significant. My
view is more positive with respect to both the deterrenceand labor
market results. It is, however, clear that the evidenceis not strong
enough to yield Congressman Conyers 'unanimous consensus.
Studies of Individuals
Take a group of convicted criminals. Compare their workrecord
with that of other citizens of the same age and sex. Invariably one
will find that the criminals will have a much more spotty work history:19
(2) The potential criminal may have chosen unemployment in
preparation for criminal activity. He/she could have had a job but
turned it down in favor of criminal activity. In this case
unemployment per se is not the cause of crime, though the overall
rewards from work relative to crime may have influenced the
individual's decision.
(3) Potential criminals are, indeed, responsive to
unemployment and legitimate earnings opportunities, but as argued
earlier their economic choices are weakly linked to the overall
economy, so that aggregate analyses fail to capture the micro—relation.
This would be the case if criminals tend to come from the back of the
'job queue' so that their employment chances are only vaguely affected
by the overall level of unemployment: when the market is good,
employers hire other workers before the potential criminal, with the
result that it takes huge swings in the overall level or special
programs to raise their employment chances.
These three explanations suggest that the unemployment —crime
link found in comparison of criminal and noncritninal work records
cannot be used to infer what happens to criminal activity when labor
market conditions change. Explanations (1) and (2) differ
fundamentally from (3), however, in that they suggest that changes in
unemployment/legitimate wage possibilities for criminals are (within
normal ranges of variation) likely to have little impact on their
criminal behavior whereas (3) suggests that if properly measured the
market opportunities facing the potential criminal would indeed reveal18
TABLE3: Preimprisonment Work Experience of Arrestees
Georgia TexasWashington D.C.
A. Proportion unemployed at 48% 47% 46%
time of arrest
B. Type of employment
Unskilled labor 45% 15% 41%
Semiskilledlabor 48% 62% 11%
C. Reported wages earned $136 $148
per week
D. Percentage earnings below 50%
$3.00 per hour
Source: Georgia and Texas, for TARP participants from Rossi,Berk, and
Lenihan, Table 7.6, p. 131. Washington D.C. from "A Supplemental Report
by the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis" in Unemployment
and Crime Hearin, pp. 111 —112.21
"supported work" ,inwhich a major effort is made to provide a social
environment encouraging work as opposed to crime. These studies give
us an indication of how ex—criminals (who, because of recividism and
the concentration of crime among a small subset of the population, can
be assumed to cause a large proportion of crime) respond to their
labormarket incentives. They also have the advantage that the
incentives are controlled by the experimenter, providing, a truly
exogenous labor market variable for study. If these studies showed a
strong link between unemployment (other labor market factors) and
crime, the case for a sizeable significant relation would be greatly
enhanced.
Unfortunately, like the other evidence in the field, these
studies, while generally supportive of a labor market —crimelink, do
not give a uniform picture either of our ability to alter labor market
opportunities to reduce criminal behavior or the relation between
unemploymentor earnings and crime. As Table 4 shows, some studies
have successfully altered behavior (the Baltimore LIFE experiment,
ProjectWildcat, Operation Pathfinder) while others have not done so
(Parole Reintegration Projects, Supported Work, Project Development
Support Services, the diverse manpower programs surveyed by Taggart).
The recent and statistically sophisticated study of the TARP
experimental program, by Rossi et al showed essentially no difference
in recividism between the experimental group (who received unemployment
compensationsothat they could better search for jobs after release20
a significant response to these opportunities.
Studies of recividism among actual releasees provide one,
albeit imperfect, way of analyzing the response of one set of potential
criminals, ex—offenders, to their own labor market experience.In an
analysis of 641 men who were in prison in NorthCarolina in 1969 or
1971 Anne Witte found that whereas the wage level received ontheir
first job tended to decrease arrests or conviction the variable
measuring unemployment had an unexpected negative effect as well,
giving a rather mixed picture of the effect of labormarket on the
behavior of these persons. The Rossi—Berk—Lenihan analysis ofTARP
participants in Texas and Georgia, by contrast, showed a significant
tradeoffbetween number of arrests and weeks employed, with those
employed longer having fewer arrests. In addition, however, theyfound
aweak or anomalous relation between their measure of the labormarket
(unemployment in the county of the release) and theindividual's
employmentexperience, so thatthe aggregate market variable had no
effect on the individual's behavior.
At present there are too few studies of individual behavior to
reach any overall assessment.
Results of Social Experiments
In recent years several social experiments have been developed
to evaluate the responses of ex—offenders to job marketincentives.
The programs have varied from job placement, to provision of money to
give ex—offenders some financial security until theyfind a job to23
from prison) and the control population. Rossi et al develop a model
explaining the failure of the program to reduce crime as resulting from
the negative impact of employment on crime and the sizeable impact of
unemploymentcompensation on acceptance of jobs. Viewed in this light,
theTARP experiment supports the link between unemployment and crime,
although the experiment itself did not succeed due to failure to allow
for greater unemployment for those receiving unemployment compensation.
However, as noted earlier, there was little relation between aggregate
labor market conditions and recividistn. By contrast the Baltimore LIFE
experiment, on which TARP was modeled, found a stronger link between
unemployment in the city and crime than between the individuaYs own
work experience and crime. While these two studies lend some support
to the unemployment —crimelink, there are enough failed experiments
to call into question our ability to predict how the labor market —
crimelink will indeed operate in a particular instance.
Conclusion
So, what in fact do we know about the relation between the
labor market and crime?
As a broad generalization, the bulk of the studies examined
here show some connection between unemployment (and other labor market
variables) and crime but they fail to document a well—defined clearly
quantifiable linkage. We know:
(1) There is a cyclical pattern to crime rate, with crime rising
over the cycle with unemployment.Program (Analysis)
1. TransitiOnal Aid ResearchProject,
prisoners given up to6 months of
unemployment insurance toreduce
economic incentive foreconomic
crime [Rossi, et all.
2. Baltimore Living Insurancefor Ex—
Prisoners(LIF'E) Project, ex—prisoflers
given financial aidand job placement
aerviceS [Rossi, el al;Mellon and
Thornton; IC. Lenihan
3. Supported Work Experiment,ex—
offenders provided withsubsidized
employment and social supportfor
working [Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation]
4. Diverse Manpower Programsfor Ex—
Offenders, a variety ofvocational
training and placement programs
[Taggart I
5.Project Wildcat, employmentand
social support for ex drugaddicts
[Vera Institute]
6. Parole Reintegration ProjectS
stipends or grants given to
parolees to easetransition








those with some employment,
with no net effect. Large
unemplOymentcr3.me relation.
Financial aid reduced crime;
unemployment in city attime
of release also affected








TABLE 4: Some Expimefltal
Recivi-diSm Incentives on
Reduced criminal activity
but many employed controls
bad high recividism
Little postive impact.25
market on crime is not an open—and—shut case in which research results
are so definitive that there is no need for further work. The work is,
however, more supportive of a link than of the opposite conclusion.24
(2)There is evidence that criminals tend to have poorer
work records than noncriniinals, but only limited evidence that,
once a person embarks on crime, moderate changesin these market
opportunities will cause them to choose legitimateearnings channels.
(3) Cities and states have widely different crime rates
loosely linked to labor market conditions.
(4) In studies that include measures of criminal sanctions and
labor market factors, sanctions tend to have a greater impact on
criminal behavior than market factors.
How is the reader to evaluate the results?
For the person who strongly believes unemployment causes crime,
there is nothing in the empirical evidence to causehim/her to abandon
that belief. Weak or modest empirical support should not strengthen
One's belief, but also should not lead one to abandon an initial
stronglyheld view. On the other hand, the stronger evidence on the
deterrent effect of sanctions, should alter one's view of therelative
impact of the "carrot" and the 'stick.'
For the person who believes crime is unaffected by thelabor
market,there is also no reason to abandon his/her views,though he/she
shouldbe moved in the direction of believing "there is some difficult—
to—measure relation."
Overall, returning to CongressmanConyers question with
whichwe began the essay ——theimpact of unemployment and the labor27
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